f^^ 




iiiiliill 



566 Congress, ) HOUSE OF REPRESEl,TATIVES. j Document 

'2 Session. j \ No. 1444. 



liELA'llONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND EEPUBLIC 

OF COLOMBIA. 



MESSAGE 



FROM THE 



PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, 

TRANSMITTING 

REPORT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE ON THE SUBJECT OF RELA- 
TIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE REPUBLIC OF 
COLOMBIA. 



March 1, 1913. — Read, referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and ordered to 

be printed. 



To th( Senate and tJte House of Representatives: 

I transmit herewith for the information of the Congress a report 
made to me on February 20, 1913, by tlie Secretary of State, on the 
subject of relations between the United States and the Republic of 
Colombia. 

Wm. H. Taft. 
The White House, 

Wa.shington, March 1, 1913. 



The President: 

In the report which I had the honor to submit to you on May 17, 
1912, and which was transmitted in your message of May 22, 1912, 
to the Senate in response to the Senate's resolution of March 1, 1912, 
requesting the transmission of correspondence ^\^th the Government 
of Colombia, I stated that the possibihty of finding any reasonable 
means to put an end to the remaining ill feehng between the RepubUc 
of Colombia and the United States had, by your direction, long been 
the subject of study by the department. That study having cul- 
minated in the program ai)proved by your letter of ^'ovember 30, 
1912,1 deem it mv duty now to report upon the outcome of the efforts 
wliich the departnient had made to carry out that program and thereby 
to replace the relations of the two countries in a state of cordia] 
friendship and mutual confidence. That program was the result of 



2 UISriTED STAINS AND EEPUBLIC OF COLOMBIA. 

the exhaustive study and earnest endeavors which, by your (hrection, 
had engaged the attention of the department from the beginning of 
the administration, in accorchmce with your conviction and tliat of 
the department that, so far as consistent witli the dignity and lionor 
of the United States and with the principles of justice when apphed 
to the true facts, no effort should be spared in seeking to restore 
American-Colombian relations to a footing of completely friendly 
feeling. 

Before discussing the generous advances of this Government, which 
I regret have been, I think so mistakenly, rebuffed by the Govern- 
ment at Bogota, it will be convenient by way of recapitulation to 
sketch, in a measm'3, the antecedents of the recent attempts of the 
department to reach the hoped-for adjustment. Inasmuch, however, 
as the present report is not submitted with a vdew to its transmission 
to the Congress, nor intended as a complete survey of the very ex- 
tensive and complex historical background of the subject, I shall 
endeavor to confine it withm reasonable limits, which would not be 
possible if the vast amount of material on the subject now on file in the 
department were to be included or exhaustively summarized. 

The necessity for some brief review of what had preceded is en- 
hanced by the fact that the subject of arbitration, now again urged 
by Colombia, is intimately associated with political problems affecting 
the status of Panama, and the efforts of the Government of the United 
States to brmg about an adjustment of concatenated questions in 
which, as a party directly interested because of its rights in regard to 
the Panama Canal, this Government is the more deeply concerned. 

It seems obvious that, even assuming that any tangible issue for 
arbitration between the United States and Colombia could be made 
out, evidently no terms of arbitral submission could be entertained 
which might call in question the right of Panama to exist as a sover- 
eign State. 

At this point it should be recalled that Colombian proposals of 
arbitration, inadmissible for this and other reasons, have twice been 
rejected by this Government after full consideration b}^ two former 
Secretaries of State, Mr. Hay and Mr. Root. 

Mr. Hay, writing to Gen. Reyes on January 5, 1904, said: 

Entertaining these feelings, the Government of the United States would gladly 
exercise its good offices with the Republic of Panama, with a view to bringing about 
some arrangement on a fair and equitable basis. For the acceptance of your proposal 
of a resort to The Hague tribunal this Government perceives no occasion. Indeed, 
the questions presented in your "statement- of grievances" are of a political nature 
such as nations of even the most advanced ideas as to international arbitration have 
not proposed to deal with by that process. Questions of foreign policy and of the 
recognition or nonrecognition of foreign States are of a purely political nature and do 
not fall within the domain of judicial decision; and upon these questions this Govern- 
ment has in the present paper defined its position. 

Mr. Root, writing to a succeeding Colombian minister on February 
10, 1906; said: 

The real gravamen of your complaint is this espousal of the cause of Panama by the 
people of the United States. No arbitration could deal with the real rights and 
wrongs of the parties concerned unless it were to pass upon the question whether the 
cause thus espoused was just — whether the people of Panama were exercising their 
just rights in declaring and maintaining their independence of Colombian rule. 

We assert and maintain the affirmative upon that question. We assert that the 
ancient State of Panama, independent in its origin and by nature and history a separate 
political community, was confederated with the other States of Colombia upon terms 

D. OF 0. 



5^ 



UNITED STATES AND EEPUBLIC OF COLOMBIA. 



' ^ which preserved and continued its separate sovereignty; that it never surrendered 
• that sovereignty: thai in the year 18S5 the compact which bound it to the other States 

V of Colombia was l)r()ken and terminated by Colombia, and the Isthmus was subjugated 

"^ by force; that it was lield under loreign domination to which it had never consented; 

sj'' and that it was justly entitled to assert its sovereignty and demand its independence 
from a rule which wasimlawlul. o])pressive. and tyrannical. We can not ask the people 
of Panama to consent that this right of theirs, which is vital to their political existence, 
shall be submitted to the decision of any arbitrator. Nor are we willing to permit any 
arbitrator to determine the political policy of the United States in following its sense 
of right and justice by espousing the cause of this weak people against the stronger 
Government of Colombia, which had so long held them in unlawful subjection. 

There is one other subject contained in your note which I can not permit to pass 
without notice. You repeat the charge that the Government of the United States 
took a collusive part in fomenting or inciting the uprising upon the Isthmus of Panama 
which ultinialely resulted in the revolution. I regret that you should see fit to thus 
renew an aspersion upon the honor and good faith of the United States in the face of 
the positive and final denial of the fact contained in Mr. Hay's letter of January 5, 
1904. You must be well aware that the universally recognized limitations upon the 
subjects proper for arbitration forbid that the United States should submit such a 
question to arbitration. In view of your own recognition of this established limitation, 
I have been unable to discover any justification for the renewal of this unfounded 
assertion. 

It is important to note also that the Government oT Colombia has 
never to this clay presented anything even a])proaching a question 
justiciable by arbitration, it being a universally recognized principle 
that neither indefinite nor i)urely political matters are of a nature to 
be arbitrated. 

It is perhaps useful to advert somewhat more to the background 
of previous events. On January 22, 1903, was signed at Washington 
the treaty between the United States and Colombia, known as the 
Hay-Herran treaty, for the construction of an interoceanic canal by 
the" United States. This treaty, although essentially conforming to 
the pro}K)sals of Colombia, besides being eminently just and even 
generous, was enthusiastically welcomed by its direct beneficiaries, 
the people of the Panaman Isthmus. In Bogota it was coldly received. 
At the first signs of opposition in the Colombian Congress discontent 
and resentment were maniiested in Panama. As the possibility of 
the treaty's being rejected at Bogota grew to a i>robability, the idea 
of regaining their historical autonomy awakened and became strong 
in the minds of Panamans. The contingency of secession was openly 
discussed and advocated. Months before the event the representa- 
tives of Panama in the Congress at Bogota raised their voices in 
unheeded warning. The certainty, which soon became evident, that 
the canal treaty would be rejected ]iroved their warning true. The 
bloodless revolution of November 3, 1903, followed, with instant 
success. Within 48 hours from the proclamation of Panaman inde- 
jiendence the last vestige of Colombian authority on the Isthmus had 
disap])eared and the jieople of Panama, through the unanimous vote 
of their mimicipalities, had ratified the Republic. 

Imbued with the inherited spirit of territorial nationality and the 
recollection of their ancient geograpliical entity, the keen interest of 
the Panaman people in the estabhshment of interoceanic transit 
through their territorv is readily comprehensible and it is no cause 
for siirprise that they were impatient of the obstacles set by the 
Government at Bogota, through its rejection of the Hay-Herran 
treaty, in the way of the accomphshment of the stupendous work of 
the canal. The feehngs of the people of Panama were early shown 



4 UNITED STATES AND EEPUBLIC OF COLOMBIA. 

throiigii the declaration made by their representative in the Colom- 
bian Congress and echoed by other farsighted members, that a fail- 
ure to ratify the canal treaty would be followed immechatel}'^ by a 
separatist revolution. It was a matter of common notoriety in the 
city of Bogota that such an outcome of the rejection of the treaty 
was inevitable. Although amply forewarned, the authorities at 
Bogota appear to have courted the impending result. The Colom- 
bian President contributed to bring it about by liis amazing departure 
from the practice of nations iu failing even to recommend for approval 
a treaty signed under the explicit direction of its President on behalf 
of the sovereign State by its empowered agent. In the Hght of the 
manifested spirit of the people of Panama, it is evidently quite 
superfluous to allege that this revolutionary sentiment was fomented 
by persons in the United States. Outside pressure, even by inter- 
ested private parties, would seem to have been a work of superero- 
gation, even if its existence were a fact. The separation became a 
patent certainty from the moment the Colombian executive and 
Congress foredoomed th3 treaty to failure. 

The Government of the United States, being satisfied that a de 
facto government, republican in form and without substantial oppo- 
sition from its own people, had been there established, extended its 
recognition to the new Republic of Panama on November 6, 1903. 
From almost the very day in November, 1903, that Panama regained 
the attribute of self-government which that State had possessed 
without question from the time of emancipation from Spanish domi- 
nation to the time of its incorporation by conquest into the centralized 
Government of Colombia, the Government of the United States bent 
its earnest efforts toward effecting a just and practical settlement to 
which Panama, equally ^^dth the United States and Colombia, should 
be a party. 

The earlier representations of the Colombian Government, after the 
recognition of the Republic of Panama and the conclusion of the 
canal treaty, did not urge arbitration, except by way of alternative 
submission of pending questions to an impartial court should a 
diplomatic arrangement not be feasible. These representations were 
made up of complaints and charges against the United States with 
imputation of violation of treaty and general bad faith. Colombia 
then insisted upon reparation being made by the Government of the 
United States. This is shown by the correspondence heretofore 
published. 

As an element of the proposed negotiation for a conventional set- 
tlement a suggestion of arbitration was made which looked to '' the 
settlement of the claims of a material order wliich either Colombia or 
Panama by mutual agreement may reasonably bring forward against 
the other as a consequence of facts preceding or following the decla- 
ration of independence of Panama." Tliis proposition, as formu- 
lated, was favored by Secretary Hay, together with the proposal 
that a plebiscite should determine whether the people of the Isthmus 
preferred allegiance to the Republic of Panama or to the Repubhc 
of Colombia (Mr. Hay to Gen. Reyes, Jan. 13, 1904). Both these 
proposals were considered in the subsequent negotiations of the tripar- 
tite treaties, wliich aimed to settle all claims ''of a material order" 
between Colombia and Panama and which were, in terms, largely 



UNITED STATES AND EEPUBLIC OF COLOMBIA. 5 

responsive to the Colombian demands in this regard; but the only 
.subject to be submitted to arbitration under the abortive treaty 
l)etween Colombia and Panama signed by Messrs. Cortes and Arose- 
niena was the boundary line in the long-disputed district of Jurado. 
No |)ro^^sions for a Panaman plebiscite appeared therein. Even that 
l)ro|)osed ahernative of arbitration thus disappeared when the })arties 
to the controversy reached- tlie conventional accord formulated in the 
tripartite treaties of January 9, 1909. 

The negotiations of these treaties with the United States and 
Panama for the adjustment of all c{uestions between the tliree parties 
were ])roposed by the Government of Colombia itself. 

The negotiations stretched over a period of some three years, 
being interrupted from time to time by fresh demands on the part of 
Colombia and liampered in their course by what seemed a very 
inconsistent reversion of the Colombian plenipotentiaries of the time 
to attem])t to create issues any bases for which had in effect been 
set aside by Colombia's own proposal to settle the material questions 
involv(Ml. On one occasion the obstructive tactics of the Colombian 
])lenipotentiary were virtually disavowed by his recall and the 
substitution of another more in accord with the policies of his 
Government. 

The issue had thus been early narrowed to the cjuestion of com- 
pensation for the losses and injuries pleaded by Colombia, and, it 
being undeniable that Colombia had suffered by failure to reap a 
share of the benefits of the canal, the Government of the United 
States was entirely willing to take this consideration into account, 
antl to endeavor to accommodate the conflicting interests of the three 
parties by the conventional fixation of a just measure of com- 
pensation, in money or in material equivalence. Throughout the 
whole discussion the course of the United States was marked by 
kindly forbearance and ec(uitable generosity. The result was the 
signature on January 9, 1909, of three treaties, one between the 
United States and the RejDublic of Colombia, one between the United 
States and the Republic of Panama, and one between Colombia and 
Panama, all three being interdependent, to stand or fall together. 
The treaties between the United States and the respective Repubfics 
of Colombia and of Panama received the ad^dsory and consenting 
approval of the Senate on the respective dates of February 24 and 
March 3, 1909. That between Colombia and Panama was ratified 
by the Repubhc of Panama January 27, 1909, while the treaty with 
the United States was ratified by Panama three days later. 

It seems unnecessary for the purposes of this report to narrate the 
elaborate negotiations which preceded the signature of the "tripar- 
tite" treaties. The Senate, in executive session, was apprised of the 
processes by wliich the conventional results w^ere reached and the 
nature of those results is made apparent by the text of the three in- 
struments. That their jn-ovisions sought to deal, adequately, justly, 
and in the only practical manner so far suggested, with the interna- 
tional jiroblems growing out of the secession of Panama and out of 
the assumption by the United States of the great work of construct- 
ing the canal, would appear to be evident to the unprejudiced mind. 
The interests and honor of the three countries were, throughout the 
negotiation, jealously guarded by their respective plenipotentiaries, 
and their agreement on all vital points was a confirmatory safeguard. 



6 UNITED STATES AND EEPUBLIC OF COLOMBIA. 

Nevertheless, negotiated as these treaties were at the instance of 
Colombia, and framed as they were with every desire to accommodate 
their terms to the just expectations of Colombia; and although they 
were accepted by the Colombian cabinet, which made repeated efforts 
to bring about conditions favorable to their approval by the Congress, 
the treaties still remain unacted upon. 

It thus remained for the Colombian Government to hold up the 
treaties, to propose the nullification of all the negotiations which had 
led up to their conclusion and which it had invited, and to suggest 
entrance upon new negotiations with the United States alone. This 
suggestion the United States then declined to accept, holding that 
the ' 'tripartite" treaties must stand or fall together and that no such 
substitutionary arrangement could be considered without the har- 
monious agreement of all three parties. In the same attitude, the 
Colombian Government, without seeking the consent of the United 
States to enter, after these two rebuffs, upon a discussion of an en- 
tirely different character, sought to revert to its former proposal of 
some kind of settlement by arbitration. 

The next proposal of Colombia, on January 5, 1910, was that the 
United States and Panama should agree to submit to a plebiscite the 
question of the separation of Panama with the promise that the inter- 
ests of the United States in the Canal Zone should not be affected by 
the result. This proposal as made was considered intangible and 
impracticable, although, as late as March 26, 1910, it appears to have 
been the subject of an informal suggestion- of the Colombian minister, 
coupled with the promise that if the vote should be unfavorable to 
the status of Panama the Government of Colombia would formally 
recognize the acts of Panama in the canal matter. 

Again the suggestion of arbitration in somewhat more tangible 
form appears in the shape of a confidential memorandum, under date 
of November 30, 1910, expressing the view of Senor Olaya, the Colom- 
bian minister for foreign affairs, that, as the provision of Article 
XXXV of the treaty of 1846 m regard to the guarantee by the United 
States of Colombian sovereignty over the territory of the Isthmus 
was differently interpreted by the two Governments, the question 
Avhether the acts of the United States on the Isthmus in 1903 were 
not in harmony with the engagements of Article XXXV, appeared 
to be a judicial issue proper for arbitral determination. This in- 
formal suggestion appeared to involve proposals already rejected by 
Secretaries Hay and Root. It did not, moreover, materialize in a 
shape admitting of discussion, and was lost to sight when, about the 
same time, a new turn was given to the matter by the suggestion of 
the Colombian foreign office'that, with a few changes ("more appar- 
ent than real") the treaties might be approved. No tangible pro- 
posal was offered, however, as to the changes desired, although it was 
intimated in January, 1911, that they might import confirmation of 
Colombia's claim to the ownership of the Panama Railway and of 
alleged rights and interests in any canal contract or concession 
granted by Colombia. This intimation, like others put forward dur- 
ing 1910, never reached the stage of diplomatic discussion. 

Still another phase supervened when, on March 28, in view of the 
statement alleged to have been made by ex-President Roosevelt in an 
address delivered at Berkelev, Cal., on March 23, to the effect that 
"he took the Canal Zone," the Colombian minister, Senor Borda, 



UNITED STATES AND KEPUBLIC OF COLOMBIA. 7 

const I'll inii' this rt'porlod utterance as an admission tliat Jiis nation had 
been " ^gratuitously, prol'ouiidly, and unex])ectedly oft'cnded and 
injured," demanch'd that the divinity and lionor of Colombia should 
"receive satisfaction."" No diphnnatic discussion of this incident 
ensued. 

At tiie end of May, 1911, iSeiior Borda took leave of the President, 
and returned to Colombia, being replaced by Gen. Pedro Nel Ospina, 
who presented his credentials ]\Iay 31, 1911. 

No record exists of any effort by tliis new minister of Colombia to 
reach an nnderstanding in regard to the Panama controversy or the 
tripartite treaties nntil Iiis note of November 25, 1911. In that note 
he reciteil " tiie ntter iinlikeliliood" of a di])lomatic settlement of the 
Panaman issues; characterized the attempt to regulate tlie situation 
by the direct agreement embodied in the tripartite treaties of 1909 as 
" most inifortunate," owing to the adverse sentiment of the Colombian 
people which had brought about the expatriation of tlie head of the 
Government and of the plenipotentiar}^ (Senor Cortes) by whom tliey 
were signed; asserted that it had been demonstrated practically that 
the desired settlement of the existing differences could not be reached 
l)y direct agreement, and urged resort to the decision of an impartial 
tribunal as to the inter])retation to be given to that part of the still 
existing treaty of 1S46, by which the United States, in return for 
valuable concessions, assumed the obligations to guarantee to New 
Granada (now Colombia) '^the rights of sovereignty and property 
which she has and possesses over the territory of the Isthmus of 
Panama." 

In conformity with usage, it was to be expected that the envoy 
would follow uj) such a communication by seeking personal conference 
with the Secretary of State to clear the way for formal treatment of a 
proposal alike so important and so vaguely comprehensive. As a 
matter of course, and as a part of the public duty of his office, the 
Secretar}- of State was and is, at all times, ready to hold such con- 
ference with a foreign representative, knowing the advantage to both 
parties in such a case, of thoroughly understanding each other's views 
before their expression in official correspondence. Moreover, a just 
regard for the sensibilities of a nation with which this Government 
sincerely desires to maintain friendly intercourse naturally made 
the Secretary of State averse to making a categorical refusal of the 
proposition, while on the other hand the vagueness of the proposal, 
like the nature of some of its implications, forbade its academic dis- 
cussion without a more distinct understanding of its true scope. Gen. 
Nel Isjiina, however, held aloof from the Department of State. 

blatters were in this posture when, on the eve of the departure of the 
Secretary of State on a mission of good will and earnest amity toward 
the several Republics of the Caribbean, a kindly personal intimation 
of the pleasure it would afford the Secretary to include Colombia in 
his itinerary was met by the assertion that such a visit would be 
'■ inopportune. ■■ Included in this reply to an urbane note were 
arguments and also accusations tending to impugn the honor and 
good faith of the United States. It is gratifying to know that this 
singular course of the minister was taken on his own initiative and was 
reprobated by his Government. The incident was not of interna- 
tional moment, but it was closed by the spontaneous recaU of the 
envoy by his Government, leaving nothing in the path of that good 



8 UjSTITED states and EEPUBLIC of COLOMBIA. 

understanding which this country desires to maintain with its fellow 
Republic. 

It is thus seen that the request of Colombia for arbitration has only re- 
centl}^ advanced from the status of a suggested contingent alternative, as 
a resort m case of failure to attain a diplomatic adjustment, to that of a 
request predicated on the impossibility of such a direct settlement, an 
impossibility, if it be one, only because of the act of the Colombian 
Government in twice repudiating settlements already agreed upon on 
two occasions by the procedure usual in the intercourse of nations. 

It is also to be seen that, while the request takes the same form as 
the earlier suggested contingent alternative and appears to confine 
the subject matter of arbitration to ascertainment of the true intent 
of an isolated clause of Article XXXV of the treaty of 1846, a deci- 
sion m that regard would revive the old charges and bring them mto 
the arbitral proceedings. 

It does not seem timely or pertinent to the purposes of this mes- 
sage to discuss these charges, which were exhausted in the corre- 
spondence of 1904 and 1905, and which were necessarily laid aside 
when the two Governments entered upon negotiations for a friendly 
adjustment of their differences, with the result of agreement upon 
conventional terms of settlement. It suffices to say that the thirty- 
fifth article of the treaty of 1846 is necessarily to be construed as a 
whole, that the reciprocal obligations of the United States and Co- 
lombia were framed to enable this country to enjoy and maintain the 
enjoyment of the privileges of free uninterrupted isthmian transit, 
and that the transit was to be kept open by the United States upon 
occasion, free from disturbance from within or aggression from with- 
out. The stipulation which the Colombian Government isolates 
from its context and seeks to make the sole basis of its contention is 
in its essence a part of the rights reserved to the United States in 
order to secure to itself the tranquil and constant enjoyment of the 
advantages of the transit. 

While it is styled as being in compensation for these advantages 
and in return for the general commercial privileges accorded by the 
convention, it is perfectly clear that, like the ''perfect neutrality" of 
the Isthmus, the guarantee of the rights of sovereignty and property 
is to the end ' ' that the free transit from the one to the other sea may 
not be interrupted or embarrassed in any future time while this 
treatj^ exists." And here it may not be out of place to observe that 
the neutrality of the Isthmus is not its international-law neutrality. 
The word neutrality has many meanings and shades of meaning 
besides its strictly technical sense of impartiality between alien 
belligerents, and is too often indefiniLely or irrelevantly employed. 
In tills instance, the obvious sense is ttiat the territorv covered bv 
the transit is not to be allowed to become an arena of foreign assault 
or internal disturbance that may impair the tranquil enjoyment of 
its use. The United States has exercised the right to prevent such 
interruption in the past upon occasion, sometimes with the consent 
of Colombia, sometimes without it, sometimes at the request 
of Colombia herself in times of civil disturbance, and in the latter 
case not in fulfillment of any supposed duty to uphold the authoritv 
of the titular Government of the territory, but to prevent disorderly 
interference with the transit. Indeed, the very acts of the United 
States upon the Isthmus of which Colombia complained comport 



\ 



UNITED STATES AND REPUBLIC OF COLOMBIA. 9 

I'lillv with llic rii;ht and duty of the United States under the treaty 
of IS46 to keo]) the hne of transit free from the paralyzing disturbance 
of civil war, just as it would have been a right and duty to prevent 
its being a i)re3^ of alien rapacity in violation of the territorial rights 
of its own nationals. 

When a new American minister, Mr. James T. Du Bois, was sent 
to Colombia, in the latter half of 1911, he was informed of the desire 
of the United States to find some means consistent with its dignity 
and honor whereby an end might be put to the ill-feeling of Colom- 
bia. The view of this Government that, as a condition precedent to 
any real hope of this desirable result, there should be some modifica- 
tion of attitude in the direction of reasonableness on the part of the 
Colombian Government was explained, and much time was given 
by Mr. Du Bois to a careful study of the relations between the two 
countries. In the summer of 1912 he returned from Bogota to confer 
with the Department of State as to how a just and fair settlement 
of our differences with Colombia could be reached. 

A program having been evolved which was thought fully responsive 
to all the needs of the situation, as fresh evidence of the sincere 
desire of the United States to allay once for all the ill feeling existing 
in Colombia, the minister was given full instructions and proceeded 
to his post. In view of the experience of this Government in seeing 
adjustments carefully made twice shattered by the failure of their 
final acceptance at Bogota, it was felt that any fresh formal proposals 
should certainly emanate from the Colombian Government. The 
minister was therefore authorized simply to make known through 
informal and confidential conversations certam bases which, if 
reduced to the form of proposals made to the United States by the 
Government of Colombia, would receive sympathetic consideration 
by this Government as forming a practical means of complete adjust- 
ment of all existing differences with Colombia. 

The program which the minister laid before the Colombian Gov- 
ernment in the tentative and informal manner indicated comprised 
the following points: 

(1) That if Colombia would ratify the Root-Cortes and Cortes- 
Arosemena treaties as they stood the United States would be willing 
to sign an additional convention paying to Colombia 110,000,000 
for a permanent option for the construction of an interoceanic canal 
through Colombian territory and for the perpetual lease of the islands 
of St. Andrews and Old Providence. In the event that the Colombian 
Government felt that on account of their relationship with Panama 
there existed difficulties in which they might desire the assistance 
of the United States the minister was to intimate that there might 
be added a stipulation that the United States would be willing to 
use its good offices with the Government of Panama for the purpose 
of securing an amicable adjustment by arbitration or otherwise of the 
Colombia-Panama boundary dispute and of any other mattei's 
pending between the two countries. Again, if such a proposal by 
Colom1)ia seemed impossible the minister was instructed to intimate 
that in addition to the foregoing the Government of the United 
States would be willing to conclude with Colombia a convention sub- 
mitting to arbitration the question of the o^^'nership of the reversion- 
arv rio:hts in the Panama Railwav. which the Colombian Govern- 



10 UNITED STATES AND EEPUBLIC OF COLOMBIA. 

nient asserts that it possesses, and looking to proper indemnity 
should the Colombian contention be sustained. 

(2) In the event that the Colombian Government should be 
strongly averse to making a proposal involving the ratification of the 
Cortes-Arosemena treaty with Panama, then the minister was to 
intimate that this Government would be wilhng to consider the 
foregoing proposal, even with certain amendments. These amend- 
ments were to be: First, the addition of a protocol whereby the United 
States would undertake to use its good offices on behalf of Colombia 
in the adjustment of boundary questions between it and Panama; 
and, second, a convention whereby the Root-Cortes treaty between 
Colombia and the Uaited States should be amended to the extent of 
eliminating its interdependence upon the Cortes-Arosemena treaty 
while preserving to Colombia the important advantages it would give 
that country in reference to the use of the Panama Canal — one effect 
of this charge being that Colombia would have either definitively to 
forego the payment of $2,500,000 to be made it under the original 
tripartite arrangement, or at least to forego such pajmient until such 
future time, if ever, when the Colombian Government might find it 
convenient to ratify the Cortes-Arosemena treaty. 

The minister returned to Bogota on January 15, 1913, and at once 
proceeded to carry out his instructions. 

The foregomg constituted the complete program of the extreme 
limits to which, m the judgment of the department, the Government 
of the United States would be justified, from any point of view, in 
going in the rather extraordinary efforts thus undertaken to eliminate 
once for all all causes of friction, whether justified or not, between 
the two countries. 

The lease of Colombia's rights in two small Caribbean Islands was 
included as a possible safeguard in the matter of canal defense and 
for the purpose, regardful of Colombia's dignity, of clothing the dis- 
cussion with a larger aspect of mutuality of consideration. The 
option for an interoceanic canal through Colombian territory where 
there has been, from time to time, recrudescent discussion of such a 
possible canal project in the Atrato region was introduced in accord- 
ance with the same policy which actuated the Government of the 
United States in encouraging the recent convention with Nicaragua, 
although the probability of such an undertaking m that region is 
regarded as far more remote than is true with reference to the Nica- 
raguan route. In pursuance of the same broad policy of setting at 
rest once for all all talk of any rival interoceanic canal not controlled 
by the United States, the department was convinced of the desu'- 
ability of such a convention, which, like the lease of the islands 
above mentioned, offered further opportunity to give semblance of 
consideration for the payment proposed. 

The remainder of the program is quite simple and offers to give 
to Colombia all the advantages given by the tripartite treaties 
and in a manner most considerate of the present Colombian feeling 
toward the Republic of Panama, while, at the same time, as is of 
paramount necessity, jealously guarding the fixed rights and interests 
of the United States, which, of course, could not be permitted to be 
called in question. 

On January 20, Mr. Du Bois had a preliminary conversation with 
the President of Colombia and informally discussed with him the 
first alternative of the program, viz, that including the ratification 



UNITED STATES AND REPUBLIC OF COLOMBIA. 11 

by Colombia of the tripartite treaties. He was informed by the 
President that ho coiihl not and would not consent to recommend 
to the ColombianCon<;ress ratification of the^Vi'osemena-Cortes treaty. 
In reply to an inquiry from the minister whether he should proceed to 
offer the secontl alternative, he was informed by the Secretary of 
State that he could do so if and when he was absolutely satisfied 
that the decision of the Colombian President was final, it being under- 
stood that the United States could not consider any other or further 
concession than incUcated in the second form of the program. 

The minister tlien proceeded further with his conversations, and 
on January 27, 1913, telegraphed to the Secretary of State that the 
proposition for the perpetual lease of the islands of Old Providence 
and St. Andrews was embarrassing to the Colombian Government, 
l)eing regarded as practically a sale of the islands, which could not 
be ratified. Inquiry was made by the minister for his information 
and guidance whether a liberal option for coaling, airship, and wireless 
stations on one or ])othof the islands, together with a 60-year option 
on the Atrato Canal route would be acceptable to the United States. 
The minister in rc])ly was cautioned to avoid maldng any proposals, 
which should logical!}' come from the Government of Colombia, but 
was informed that if he could assure the Dej^artment of State that 
that Government would accept and the Colombian Congress ratify 
the agreement, without seeking any additional concessions, should this 
Government be willing to accept coaling stations instead of the 
])erpetual lease of the islands, the proposal would be considered. 
With respect to ])lacing a time limit on the canal-route option he 
was instructed that he sliould discourage positively any thought on tlie 
))art of Colond)ia tliat a 60-year term would be acceptable if the United 
States were to ])ay any such figure as was named in his instructions. 

The next information received from the minister was contained in a 
telegram, dated January 31, 1913, and was to the effect that the 
Colombian Government seemed determined to treat with the incoming 
Democratic administration. 

These friendly, considerate, and conciliatory efforts to put the rela- 
tions between the United States and Colombia on a more cordial basis 
having thus failed, the minister at Bogota was instructed by telegraph 
on February 7, 1913, to drop the matter after communicating to th^ 
Colombian Presi(h'nt a personal note as follows: 

Althoiish your excellency will doubtless appreciate that those intimations which I 
liave been able to give of the nature of a proposal which, if made by Colombia, would 
be considered by my Government naturally had reference only to the time at which 
1 had ihe honor to make them, nevertheless, in order to avoid even a remote possibility 
of misunderstandins:. I am directed to make it entirely clear to your excellency that 
nothing which has transpired in these purely personal and informal conAersations is 
to be regarded as any indication of what may be the future disposition of the Govern* 
ment of the United States or as committing my Government in any respect whatever, 
my efforts to arrive at some definite conclusion having, to my regret, come to naught. 

The minister has informed the department that after final discus- 
sion he has presented a note in the above sense. 

The most recent telegrams from the minister show that quite aside 
from his instructions and acting upon his personal responsibility, 
Mr. Du Bois, as a matter of curiosity, sounded the Colombian Govern- ' 
ment still further in order to elicit a clearer idea of its pretentions. 
It was intimated to the minister that if the Colombian Government 
would make })ro])osals in accordance with his informal suggestions a 
revolution would, in its opinion, result. 



12 UNITED STATES AND EEPFBLIC OF COLOMBIA. 

Continuing in his evident personal desire to sound, if possible, the 
limits of Colombian pretentions, the minister also inquired whether 
an offer of $10,000,000 without the considerations which had been 
suggested would be acceptable. To this he was informed that it 
would not; that all his suggestions fell short by far of what Colombia 
could accept. To his inquiry, what terms Colombia would accept, 
the reply was: "The arbitration of the whole Panama question or a 
direct proposition from the United States to compensate Colombia 
for all the moral, physical, and financial losses sustained by it because 
of the separation of Panama." This, it was intimated, was the last 
word of the Colombian Government. 

The very latest telegram from Mr. Du Bois shows that in a subse- 
quent interview he took it upon himself informally to ask whether if 
the United States should, without requesting options or privileges of 
any kind, offer Colombia $25,000,000, its good offices with Panama, 
the arbitration of the question of reversionary rights in the Panama 
Railway, and preferential rights of the canal, the Government would 
accept; to which he was answered in the negative. 

Included in this most recent telegraphic correspondence is a state- 
ment of the impression of the legation at Bogota that the Colombian 
Government cherishes the expectation that the incoming administra- 
tion will arbitrate the entire Panama question, or will directly com- 
Sensate Colombia for the value of the territory of Panama, the Panama 
!,ailway, the railroad annuities, and the contract with the French 
Canal Co. 

I merely mention the results of these personal inquiries made by 
Mr. Du Bois, as I have said, in his personal capacity and without any 
authority, because they throw so much light upon the Colombian 
obsession with regard to this whole subject. This attitude resulting 
in the rebuff of generous overtures by the United States is undoubtedly 
due in a great measure to a radical misconception of real public 
opinion in the United States, engendered probably by reiterated 
criticism in certain uninformed quarters leveled at the policy of this 
Government at the very time it was bending every eft'ort to adjust 
its relations with Colombia and required for such adjustment an 
atmosphere of calm instead of one of captious attack and unreasoning 
encouragement of an arbitrary attitude on the part of the foreign 
country with which it was dealing. 

Feeling that this Government has made every effort consistent with 
the honor, dignity, and interests of the United States in its sincere 
aim to bring about a state of better feeling on the part of the Govern- 
ment of Colombia, it is with regret that I have to report that these 
efforts are thus far still met by a desii'e for impossible arbitrations, and 
80 have proved unavailing unless, indeed, they may yet prove fruitful 
in the course of time of a more reasonable and friendly attitude on 
the part of Colombia. 

Meanwhile, the Government of Colombia would appear to have 
closed the door to an}^ further overtures on the part of the United 
States. 

Respectfullv submitted. 

P. C. Knox. 

Department of State, 

Washington, February 20, 1913.. 

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